This study develops a prediction model for identifying accounting fraud by analyzing the accounting information for Japanese firms. In particular, we (1) explore the characteristics of accounting fraud firms by analyzing financial information obtained from annual reports (yukashoken-houkokusho in Japanese) and (2) develop a model for predicting accounting fraud based on the characteristics of Japanese fraud firms. To identify the characteristic of fraud firms, we focus on 39 variables for the eight factors of "accruals quality," "performance," "nonfinancial measures," "off-balance-sheet activities," "market-related incentives," "conservatism," "real-activities manipulation," and "Japanese-specific factors." Through our univariate analysis and model building process, we find that "accrual quality," "market-related incentives," "real-activities manipulation," "conservatism" and "Japanese-specific factors" are generally useful for detecting accounting fraud. We also conduct several analyses that test the predictive ability of our models, including (1) the detection rates of fraud firms, (2) Type I and Type II error rates, (3) marginal effect analysis on independent variables, and (4) robustness tests on time periods and industry clustering. We find that our models have generally higher predictive power in detecting accounting fraud. We expect that our models can be used widely in various accounting and finance practices.
Introduction
Recent accounting scandals such as Toshiba and Olympus Corporation in Japan have significantly damaged the reliability of accounting information and Japanese capital markets. Exploring the cause and consequence of accounting fraud is of critical importance to the efficient functioning of capital markets (Dechow et al. 2011) . In particular, determining how to detect earnings manipulation has been one of the major concerns for both accounting research and business practice (Beneish 1999a; Lee et al. 1999; Ettredge et al. 2006; Brazel et al. 2009; Dechow et al. 2011) . This study develops a prediction model for detecting accounting fraud among Japanese firms. Specifically, we explore the characteristics of accounting fraud firms by analyzing financial information obtained from the annual reports (yukashoken-houkokusho in Japanese) of Japanese firms and then develop a model for predicting accounting frauds based on the characteristics of Japanese fraud firms. In developing the model, we focus on the quality of earnings such as earnings management and accounting conservatism.
We use two data sauces to identify accounting fraud firms in Japan. First, we collect firms that have been accused or had administrative monetary penalties imposed by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) for misstatements of financial reports on material issues (SESC firms). Second, we focus on firms that have reported accounting fraud via the Timely Disclosure Rules of the stock exchange (TDR firms). As no prior studies have examined accounting fraud in Japanese firms, our subsidiary purpose is to construct a database of accounting fraud. Beneish (1999a) examines the relationship between financial statement data and earnings manipulation. He provides a probit model to detect earnings manipulation by analyzing eight financial ratios. Prior studies also reveal that some information is useful for detecting accounting fraud, such as accounting accruals (Lee et al., 1999) , deferred tax (Ettredge et al., 2006) and nonfinancial measures (Brazel et al., 2009) . Dechow et al. (2011) comprehensively examine the relationship between accounting information and accounting misstatement. They focus on five factors-accruals quality, performance, nonfinancial measures, off-balance-sheet activities, and market-related incentives-for use in identifying misstatements and develop a model for predicting misstatements by analyzing 28 financial characteristics variables. They reveal that the output of their prediction model, F-Score, has a strong predictive ability for misstatements.
Although we generally follow the analysis procedure employed by Dechow et al. (2011) , we extend their study in several ways. First, we conduct a detailed analysis of accruals quality. Dechow et al. (2011) do not use discretionary accruals to construct their prediction models; we do use them, based on various estimation models. The discretionary accruals are generally used to capture earnings management behavior (Dechow et al. 2010) . The research suggests that discretionary accruals are strongly associated with the incidence of accounting fraud (Dechow et al. 1996 ). In addition to the level of discretionary accruals, we use the absolute value and standard deviation of discretionary accruals in order to capture the effect of accruals reversal.
Second, while earnings management has generally been classified into accrual-based and real earnings management, Dechow et al. (2011) focus only on accrual-based earnings management. They note that an important avenue for future research is seeking a better understanding of the role of real transaction or cash-flow management (Dechow et al. 2011, p. 77) . Accordingly, we use real-activities manipulation variables based on Roychowdhury (2006) . Third, we also use the degree of accounting conservatism since recent studies have revealed that accounting conservatism can increase the efficiency of contracts and reduce information asymmetry among investors (Watts 2003) . We predict that the use of accounting conservatism is negatively correlated with accounting fraud.
Finally, as most prior studies, including Dechow et al. (2011) , examine accounting fraud or misstatement among US firms, we add variables that capture the specific features of Japanese firms. Specifically, we use ownership by financial institution to capture the effect of main banks. We also use ownership by business corporation to proxy for cross-shareholdings.
Thus, in addition to the five factors used by Dechow et al. (2011) -accruals quality, performance, nonfinancial measures, off-balance-sheet activities, and market-related incentives-we focus on three additional factors: real-activities manipulation, accounting conservatism, and Japanese-specific factors. We calculate 38 variables based on the above eight factors and examine the relationship between the variables and accounting fraud.
Our sample consists of 241 SESC firm-year observations and 620 TDR firm-year observations. The key results for the SESC firms, our main concern, are as follows. First, we conduct a univariate analysis to compare variables between fraud and non-fraud firms. The results indicate that most measures of accrual quality are unusually high in fraud years relative to the broad population of firms. We also find that the measures for market-related incentives, real-activities manipulation, accounting conservatism, and Japanese-specific factors are significantly higher for fraud firms than for non-fraud firms.
Second, by extracting the variables that display significant differences in the univariate analysis, we develop a prediction model for detecting accounting fraud. Model 1 includes variables obtained from the annual reports. Model 2 adds variables for market-related incentives. The output of these models is a scaled logistic probability for each firm-year, which we term the F-Score following Dechow et al. (2011) . We use a backward elimination technique to identify the incremental benefit for predicting misstatement from including information beyond the financial statements. After performing the backward elimination, we retain the following variables in Model 1: soft assets, absolute value of discretionary accruals, new financing, accounting conservatism, real-activities manipulation, and ownership by business corporation. For Model 2, we retain soft assets, absolute value of discretionary accruals, new financing, real earnings management, ownership by business corporation, and book-to-market ratio. The results indicate that many of the variables added to the model of Dechow et al. (2011) are employed in the prediction models, suggesting that our models have generally higher predictive power in detecting accounting fraud.
Finally, we conduct several analyses to test the predictive ability of our models, including (1) the detection rates of fraud firms, (2) Type I and II error rates, (3) marginal effect analysis on independent variables, and (4) robustness tests on time periods and industry clustering. We find that our models have generally higher predictive power to detect accounting fraud. For example, we rank firm-years into five portfolios based on the magnitude of their F-Score and report the frequency with which fraud and non-fraud firms fall into each quintile. If our models have better predictive ability in identifying fraud firms, we expect the fraud firms to be clustered in the fifth portfolio (Dechow et al. 2011) . Our results indicate that 59.39% of fraud firms are in Quintile 5 for Model 1 and that 90.83% of fraud firms are in Quintile 5 for Model 2. These results are higher than our expected level of 20% and the results obtained in Dechow et al. (2011) .
This study significantly contributes to the literature and has implications for accounting practice. First, it contributes to the accounting fraud literature in its detailed analysis of how earnings quality could improve the explanatory power of a prediction model. While many studies examine the relationship between accruals quality and accounting misstatements (Beneish, 1999a; Lee et al., 1999; Dechow et al., 2011) , fewer studies investigate the effect of real earnings management and accounting conservatism on accounting fraud. Our results suggest that a deeper analysis of earnings quality from various dimensions could increase the predictive power of models for detecting accounting fraud. Second, our results suggest that the institutional features of a country could be important factors in the characteristics of accounting fraud. We examine the Japanese institutional features of ownership by financial institutions and business corporations, and find that corporate ownership has a significant effect on accounting fraud. Xu and Zhang (2009) develop a model for predicting bankruptcy in the Japanese market, finding that incorporating the unique Japanese institutional features of main banks and business groups into their model improves its ability to predict the bankruptcy of Japanese listed companies, consistent with our results.
Our results also have several implications for stakeholders such as auditors, regulators investors, and other financial statement users. For instance, auditors and regulators could improve the efficiency of their decision making by estimating the probability of accounting fraud, and investors might consider an investment strategy based on the reliability of the available accounting information (i.e., F-Score).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the research on this topic. Section 3 explains the variable measurements used in this study. Section 4 outlines the sample selection process and the descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports the empirical results on the characteristics of fraud firms and develops a prediction model for identifying accounting fraud. Section 6 summarizes the results of the additional analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes the study with a summary.
Literature Review
In examining accounting fraud among US firms, most studies focus on firms that have been subject to enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for allegedly misstating their financial statements. Detailed information on such misstatements is reported in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC. Beneish (1999a) is a pioneering study that develops a model for identifying fraud firms by analyzing financial statement information. He identifies 74 AAER firms operating from 1982 and 1992 and matches the sample to 2,332 Compustat non-fraud samples using two-digit SIC industry and year codes. Using the eight financial statement ratios, he develops a probit model to estimate a likelihood of an earnings overstatement. Beneish (1999a) indicates that five financial ratios have relatively high explanatory power for accounting manipulation: the day's sales in receivables index, gross margin index, asset quality index, sales growth index, and accruals. Lee et al. (1999) show that the difference between earnings and operating cash flow (i.e., accounting accruals) is larger for fraud firms than for non-fraud firms based on a sample of 56 fraud cases covering 1978 to 1991. Ettredge et al. (2006) reveal that deferred taxes can be useful for predicting misstatements after controlling for other factors for 169 AAER firms. Brazel et al. (2009) investigate whether publicly available nonfinancial measures can be used to assess the likelihood of accounting fraud, showing that non-financial measures such as number of patents, employees, and products can be effectively used to assess fraud risk in 50 AAER firms. Okumura (2014) comprehensively investigates misstatements by Japanese firms through analyses on the features of misstatement firms in Japan, the relationship between misstatements and stock price, and the effect of corporate governance on misstatements. Okumura (2014) is closely related to our study in that, in Appendix A, he examines the predictive ability of discretionary accruals for detecting misstatement, and finds a significant relationship between discretionary accruals based on various types of Jones models and misstatements. The results suggest that discretionary accruals are useful for detecting financial misstatements among Japanese firms. 1 Finally, our research design basically follows the outline of Dechow et al. (2011) , the main purpose of which is to analyze the financial characteristics of misstating firms and to develop a model for predicting misstatements. They analyze 494 AAER firms and use 28 financial characteristics variables associated with "accruals quality," "performance," "nonfinancial measures," "off-balance-sheet activities," and "market-related incentives." First, they conduct a univariate analysis to clarify the financial characteristics of misstating firms. Specifically, they compare variables between misstatement and non-misstatement firms. They consider most important the comparison between 494 AAER firms and other firms (COMPUSTAT), which reveals that several factors-such as accruals, the extent of leasing, the number of employees, financing, and prior stock price performance-show significant differences. Second, using the variables displaying significant effects in the univariate analysis, they present models for predicting misstatements. To test their predictive ability, they conduct various analyses. The results generally show that their measure of the likelihood of manipulation (the F-Score) is a useful tool for identifying misstatement firms.
Research Design

Identification of accounting fraud firms
We form two groups of firms to identify those most likely to engage in accounting fraud: firms that have (1) been accused or had administrative monetary penalties imposed by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission and (2) announced accounting fraud at their timely disclosures.
For (1), we obtain information from the website of the Financial Services Agency (http://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/kachoukin/index.html) 2 and denote as the year of fraud the year in which the firms suffered administrative monetary penalties or the equivalent (SESC firms), excluding incidents such as misstatements of the register of shareholders, unfair financing, or insider trading, as these types of fraud are not associated with accounting fraud.
For (2), we identify firms that have announced improper accounting via the timely disclosure required by the stock exchange (TDR firms). We searched for these firms using keywords expressing suspicion of accounting fraud in timely disclosures, available from TDnet (a timely disclosure information browsing service) on the Tokyo Stock Exchange homepage and identified the year when the accounting fraud occurred. 3 We use sets of four keywords (in Japanese) for this search. First, we use teisei ("correction"), tekisetsu ("appropriate"), fusei-kaikei ("accounting fraud"). These keywords are expected to extract all firms that have corrected their yukashoken-houkokusho ("annual report") or kessan-tanshin ("earnings briefing"). Then, we clarify the reason for the correction by reviewing each report and identifying the firms that have corrected an earnings briefing due to accounting fraud. We exclude firms that announced a correction as being due to a simple error. Second, we use chien ("delay"), enki ("postpone"), and kanri ("supervision") as keywords to find firms that delayed their submission of financial statements or earnings briefings. These words are used to identify the firms that delayed submission due to accounting fraud or improper sales. Third, we use iinkai ("committee"), cyousa ("investigation"), and setchi ("installation"/"establishment") as keywords to extract the firms for which third-party committees were established due to alleged accounting fraud. Most of the firms that have carried out accounting fraud are identified through these keywords. Finally, we use kadai ("excessive"), fusei ("fraud"), and syori ("process") to extract the firms against which allegations have been made with respect to the adequacy of their accounting or cheating by employees.
For the firms extracted using the groups of four keywords, we impose further screening under the following conditions. First, we select the firms for which earnings are manipulated upward through accounting fraud with respect to accounts on the balance sheet or income statements. We focus on net assets in the balance sheet and net income in the income statements. Second, we exclude cases such as mistakes of the unit on account, modifications of explanatory materials, revisions of management earnings forecasts, and modifications of segment information, as they are likely to have little association with accounting fraud.
While the first selection criterion (i.e., SESC firms) is more important, both selection criteria have unique features. The advantage of using SESC firms is that they may provide more reliable fraud samples, as they were fully investigated by the committee. One disadvantage is that the SESC may not be able to investigate all fraud firms because such investigations are expensive. Furthermore, a sample selection bias may occur due to some particular tendency in their research policy; for example, the committee might tend to investigate larger firms more often than smaller ones. 4 The benefit of the second selection criteria (i.e., TDR firms) is that it can collect a larger number of fraud samples than the SESC firm criterion can. However, TDR firms, extracted through restatement announcements by timely disclosure, might include corrections of simple, unintentional, and minor errors. Thus, we identify the firms that are more likely to commit accounting fraud by sorting TDR firms according to the magnitude of the restatement (the details are provided below).
We use the abovementioned sample selection criteria so that one could complement the other and compensate for its shortcomings. Though the samples selected by the first criterion are more reliable, they may not include latent fraud firms. Thus, we also use the second criterion to select a larger number of fraud firms. We are also interested in seeing how the results differ among the subsamples based on the two criteria. Specifically, we use the variables described below as a proxy for accounting fraud.
Misstate1 comprises SESC firms, our primary concern. Table 1 provides details on the variables for accounting fraud firms. Misstate1 has 241 firm-year observations. Misstate2 comprises firms that announce accounting fraud by timely disclosure (i.e., TDR firms). Misstate2 contains 620 firm-year observations. 5 We set variables through Misstate3 to Misstate8 in order to gradually capture the degree of accounting fraud. To measure the variables, we focus on the total amount of correction in net earnings (net assets) 6 through restatements of financial statements and calculate the ratio of misstatements to reported earnings (reported net assets). 7 We find that the number of subsamples decreases from Misstate3 through to Misstate8, 5 We included several firms that announced their improper accounting through their timely disclosure in Misstate1 since they are strongly suspected of conducting accounting fraud. The firms are defined as having gone bankrupt or being delisted from the stock market before the submission of restatements. These observations total seven firm-years. 6 Specifically, we include the corrections of the net assets, caused by manipulation of assets and/or liabilities. 7 We calculate two ratios, (pre-correction of net income -post-correction of net income)/5-year average of pre-correction of net income) and (pre-correction of net assets -post-correction of net assets)/pre-correction of net assets. The former is called a "correction ratio of net income," and the latter is called a "correction ratio of net assets." We classify the sample into six subsamples (Misstate3 to Missate8) with 0.05 and 0.01 intervals of net income and net assets, respectively. 
Measurement of explanatory variables
This section describes the variables used to identify accounting fraud firms. The variables are based on those used in Dechow et al. (2011) , including the factors of accruals quality, performance, nonfinancial measures, off-balance-sheet activities, and market-related incentives. 8 We use two additional factors, conservatism and real-activities manipulation, in order to capture the quality of earnings more comprehensively. We also use discretional accruals based on various estimation models since they are a major proxy for earnings management behaviors. Furthermore, because our sample consists of Japanese firms, we add Japanese-specific factors as variables. Details on the definition of each variable are provided in Table 2 .
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(1) Accrual quality-related variables Accruals and discretionary accruals are traditional variables used to capture earnings management behaviors (Dechow et al. 2010; Shuto 2010) . Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms alleged by the SEC to have committed GAAP violations via earnings manipulation also engaged in earnings management within GAAP in the form of accruals management. These results suggest a relationship between accrual quality and accounting fraud.
First, we employ working capital accruals (WC accruals) as a proxy for an accruals variable. WC accruals reflect short-term accruals relating to working capital (Teoh et al. 1998; Allen et al. 2013) . Next, we use RSST accruals as an extended definition of WC accruals to include changes in long-term operating assets and long-term operating liabilities (Richardson et al. 2005) . We also examine two accruals components, Change in receivables and Change in inventory. These variables are expected to have higher flexibility for management among accruals-related accounts (Richardson et al. 2005) , and greater variable values are likely to reflect a higher probability of accounting fraud.
We also examine %Soft assets, defined as the percentage of assets on the balance sheet that are neither cash nor P&E (Dechow et al. 2011 ). Barton and Simko (2002) show that firms with greater net operating assets have more accounting flexibility with which to manage earnings. We assume that %Soft assets has a positive relationship with the probability of accounting fraud since a firm with higher %Soft assets has greater accounting flexibility with which to meet short-term earnings goals.
Finally, we examine discretionary accruals on the basis of three estimation models: the 8 The definition of the variables used in this study basically follows that of Dechow et al. (2011) to ensure comparability between the two studies. 9 Although the variables used in this study basically follow those used in Dechow et al. (2011) , we do not use the following variables: (1) earnings quality, as in Dechow and Dichev (2002) , (2) differed tax expense, and (3) pension plan assets. Variables (2) and (3) were excluded because our database does not contain these data. Variable (1) requires information in the next year (t+1) in order to measure the earnings quality in the current year (t) and therefore cannot be used, since we are building a prediction model. Dechow et al. (2011) modified Jones model (MJ discretionary accruals) of Dechow et al. (1995) ; the performance-matched discretionary accruals model (PM discretionary accruals) of Kothari et al. (1999) ; and the CFO modified Jones model (CFO discretionary accruals) of Kasznik (1999) . We estimate the parameters of each model using cross-sectional regression by industry-year. Details on the estimation methods for the models are elaborated in Appendix A. Earnings management research generally assumes that, while positive discretionary accruals imply income-increasing earnings management, negative discretionary accruals imply income-decreasing earnings Note: Predicted sign shows the expected sign of the relationship between the occurrence of accounting fraud and each independent variable. management. We also examine the standard deviation of the discretionary accruals (discretionary accruals SD) and the absolute value of the discretionary accruals (discretionary accruals AB). Managers are likely to use a large amount of discretionary earnings when they have a strong incentive to conduct aggressive earnings management. Such earnings management causes a reversal of accruals in later years and amplifies the standard deviation of discretionary accruals and earnings. Therefore, we examine the absolute values and their standard deviation over the last five years in order to capture the effect of such accruals reversals. 10 We expect that the variables related to discretionary accruals have a positive relationship with the probability of accounting fraud.
(2) Performance variables
We focus on a set of variables concerning a firm's financial performance to examine whether managers engage in accounting fraud to mask their deteriorating performance (Dechow et al. 1996; Dechow et al. 2011; Beneish 1997 Beneish , 1999b . The first variable is change in cash sales (Change in cash sales) and change in cash margin (Change in cash margin). Change in cash sales is defined as sales amount after accruals-based sales are excluded. Change in cash margin is equal to cash sales less cash cost of goods sold; the influence of accruals such as receivables and inventory are excluded from this variable. We assume that, when these performance variables decline, managers are more likely to inflate earnings by boosting accruals.
A change in ROA (Change in return on assets) is an important variable for managers who are conscious about growth of earnings (Graham et al 2005) . Therefore, increased ROA during an accounting fraud period might be caused by a manager's earnings management. Change in free cash flows is a more fundamental measure than earnings because this variable is not affected by accruals. We posit that managers have an incentive to increase earnings when free cash flow is decreasing.
(3) Nonfinancial variables
We examine two nonfinancial measures. First, we use number of employees because managers attempting to mask deteriorating financial performance will reduce employees in order to boost earnings (Brazel et al. 2009 ). We assume that the change in the number of employees (Abnormal change in employees) has a negative relationship with the probability of accounting fraud.
The second variable is the order backlog (Abnormal change in order backlog). Decreasing the order backlog is indicative of lower future sales and earnings (Rajgopal et al. 2003) . Therefore, we assume that managers facing a decreasing backlog have an incentive to engage in accounting fraud.
(4) Off-balance-sheet variables 10 In particular, our assumption is as follows. Panel C in Table 3 indicates that fraud firms tend to conduct accounting fraud over multiple years. Because firms are not able to continue to increase earnings by managing accruals, fraud firms are likely to report large negative discretionary accruals because of accruals reversal during the fraud period. Further, firm managers might conduct illegal accounting fraud after implementing income-increasing earnings management within GAAP, resulting in large negative discretionary accruals in fraud years. This suggests that the dispersion of discretionary accruals among fraud firms will be greater around the fraud year.
The most important off-balance-sheet financing variable is operating lease (Dechow et al. 2011) . Accounting for operating leases allows firms to record lower expenses in the early period of the lease term. Thus, managers who are excessively conscious of window-dressing are more likely to increase operating lease activity. Further, we expect that the use of an operating lease increases during accounting fraud. Consequently, we examine two variables: the use of the operating lease (Existence of operating lease) and its change (Change in operating lease activity).
(5) Market-related incentive variables One of the major incentives for earnings management is maintaining a high stock price (Dechow et al. 2011) . We investigate two motivations relating to stock price (Dechow et al. 2011) . The first motivation is to keep a high stock price in order to reduce the cost of raising new equity. We use four variables to capture this kind of motivation. First, we use an indicator variable identifying whether the firm has issued new equity or debt (Actual issuance). The second variable is the net amount of new financing raised (CFF). The third variable is a need of ex ante financing (Ex ante financing need), as some firms may have wished to raise new capital but could not because they were unable to secure favorable terms. The fourth variable is financing leverage (Leverage). Firms with higher leverage will have incentives to boost financial performance to both satisfy financial covenants in existing debt contracts and raise new debt on more favorable terms.
The second managerial motivation to maintain a high stock price is management compensation tied to stock price performance. Managers might also be forced to retire when stock prices decrease. Because managers are conscious of stock-based performance, they are likely to have an incentive to increase earnings. Here, we examine three variables: market adjusted stock return (Market adjusted stock-return), book-to-market (Book-to-market), and PER (Earnings-to-price). Thus, we expect that while Market adjusted stock-return has positive sign, Book-to-market and Earnings-to-price have negative signs.
(6) Accounting conservatism variables
The variables described so far basically follow the variables employed by Dechow et al. (2011) . Although Dechow et al. (2011) focused on variables relating to accrual qualities as proxies for earnings quality, we also focus on other quality measures: "conservatism" and "real activities manipulation." Conservatism reflects accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news than to recognize bad news in financial statements (Basu 1997 ). Higher conservatism is thus identified when the degree of verification needed to recognize good news (positive earnings) is higher than what is needed to recognize bad news (negative earnings). Watts (2003) argues that adopting accounting conservatism, which tends to produce conservatively measured earnings and net assets, could facilitate contract efficiency and provide reliable information to the securities market. Thus, we expect that a higher degree of conservatism improves earnings quality and restricts occurrences of accounting fraud.
We employ the method of Khan and Watts (2009) to measure the degree of conservatism. Their model is an extended version of Basu (1997) with cross-sectional regression, allowing it to measure conservatism for an individual firm. In the model, stock price returns are used as a proxy for economic loss. We measure two types of conservatism on the basis of raw stock return (C score RR) and market-adjusted stock return (C score AR). Similar to the research method for discretionary accruals, we also examine the standard deviation (C score RRSD) and absolute value (C score ARSD) of these variables. Details on the calculation of conservatism are provided in Appendix B.
(7) Real activities manipulation variables Earnings management is divided into two types: accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual-based earnings management constitutes the discretionary behaviors that occur through the discretion of recognition and estimates in accrual accounting, such as fictional accounting adjustments without a change in cash flow. We have already discussed the variables of accrual-based earnings management in subsection (1).
Real earnings management constitutes discretionary behaviors performed to manage earnings by altering a firm's real economic activities, such as a reduction in R&D activities. We employ methods proposed by Roychowdhury (2006) to comprehensively capture a manager's real earnings management.
Roychowdhury (2006) classifies a firm's real earnings management into three categories: 1) sales manipulation, 2) overproduction, and 3) reduction of discretionary expenditures. The first manipulation increases annual sales temporarily by discounting or altering sales term, causing an abnormally low cash flow over sales amount. The second manipulation boosts earnings by reducing total cost of production through excessive overproduction. In the third manipulation, managers discretionally adjust a certain amount of accrued costs (such as for R&D or advertising), resulting in abnormally high discretionary expenditures over sales amounts.
To capture these influences of real earnings management, we examine an abnormal operating cash flow (AB cash flow), abnormal discretionary expense (Discretionary expense), and abnormal product cost (AB product cost). Details on these variables are provided in Appendix C.
(8) Japanese-specific factors-related variables
We examine Japanese-specific factors related to occurrences of accounting fraud. Xu and Zhang (2009) developed a bankruptcy prediction model for Japanese firms and found that the model's performance improved when they added shareholdings by financial institutions such as main banks and a cross-shareholding among business corporations. We thus expect that these factors are useful for detecting accounting fraud since anecdotal evidence suggests that firms facing bankruptcy tend to commit it.
Shuto (2010) also finds that, while firms with higher ownership by financial institutions are not likely to conduct earnings management to avoid earnings reductions, firms with higher cross-shareholding tend to engage in earnings management to attain short-earnings targets. These results suggest that shareholdings by financial institutions restrict managers' opportunistic behaviors through shareholders' strict monitoring and that cross-shareholdings do not function as a mutual monitoring system and do not prevent earnings management.
Thus, we analyze ownership by financial institutions (FIN) and cross-shareholdings (CORP) as Japanese-specific factors. We assume that FIN (CORP) has a negative (positive) relationship with the probability of accounting fraud.
Sample selection and statistics
Sample selection
We obtained our initial samples from all the listed companies on the Japanese stock market for the period from 2000 to 2014, and eliminated the following kinds of firms: (1) financial services companies, (2) companies adopting an accounting standard other than J-GAAP, (3) companies without sufficient data to compute the F-Score.
The sample selection procedure leaves us with 65,440 firm-year observations. As shown in Table 1 , the SESC firms (i.e., Misstate1) provide 241 observations for 83 firms. The TDR firms, who announced possible improper disclosures on their financial statements, provide 620 observations for 89 firms. As described in section 3, Misstate2 includes 861 observations for 172 firms.
The data used in this analysis are obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS financial statements database and the Nikkei NEEDS market database. Special treatment is needed when analyzing the financial statements of fraud firms. The financial statements included in the database were immediately overwritten retroactively once restatement data became available from the firm. Since the purpose of this research is to build a prediction model, these overwritten data are not suitable for our use. We thus restored all the restated data to the original statements. 12 We use these restored datasets for all analyses of the fraud firms.
Features of the fraud samples
As a preliminary analysis, we first observe the features of the fraud firms. Table 3 Panel B indicates the distribution sorted by industry. The panel shows that there are more fraud firms in Service, Trading, Electronics, and Construction. We also find that the percentage of fraud firms is high in Warehouse, Power generation, and Precision machinery. Panel C presents the number of restatements caused by fraud statements. A total of 32.53% of fraud firms have restated their financial statements once, and 67.47% restated them more than twice. This result suggests that most of the fraud firms have restated their financial statements. Table 4 summarizes the contents of the misstatements-thus, the methods of accounting fraud. The table shows that the overstatement of assets is the most popular kind, including accounting receivables, inventory, and work-in-process. The magnitude of the misstatement relating to these assets is 47.15% of total revenue on average, and the number of misstatements and their amounts are also large. Fictional and inflated sales also seem to be popular methods. Note: Brackets in the "Accounting fraud firm-years" in panel B represent number of firms. Note: "Method-1" represents main method of accounting fraud. "Method-2" and "Medhod-3" represent the reasons for cases of multiple techniques. Therefore, the total percentage exceeds 100%.
Results
Univariate analysis
(1) Analysis of Misstate1 We describe the statistical features of the accounting fraud firms by comparing samples between the 241 fraud observations identified as Misstate1 and the 65,199 non-fraud observations. Table 5 summarizes the results of the univariate analyses, providing the mean and median for fraud and non-fraud firms, as well as the results of a t-test between them. The shadows in the table indicate the significant mean differences with the expected sign.
The table shows that many variables of accruals quality show significant differences between fraud and non-fraud firms. First, soft asset ratio (% Soft assets) is strongly significant, which implies that firms with higher soft asset ratios have more flexibility in earnings manipulation. Second, the values of almost all the discretionary accruals variables of the fraud firms are higher than are those of the non-fraud firms, as expected. This indicates that the discretionary accruals are useful for detecting accounting fraud. Furthermore, their derivatives, such as the standard deviation of discretionary accruals (discretionary accruals SD) and their absolute value (discretionary accruals AB) indicate more significant differences on the basis of t-statistics. This result suggests that a consideration of accrual reversal may improve accounting fraud prediction.
None of the variables of performance, nonfinancial, or off-balance-sheet is significant. The non-significance of the performance variables is consistent with the result in Dechow et al. (2011) . On the other hand, most of variables of market show significant differences. We find that the book-to-market (Book-to-market) has strong significant differences, with a t-value of 25.3, the highest value among the results for all the variables. The firms with higher financial needs (Actual issuance), higher leverage company (Leverage), and lower PER (Earnings-to-price) are more likely to conduct accounting fraud.
We also find that all variables of accounting conservatism have significant differences. The variables calculated by using the market adjusted return (C score AR, and C score ARSD) show more significant results than do those calculated by using the raw return. The results suggest that the firms with higher conservatism are less likely to be accounting fraud firms.
The table reveals that the abnormal operating cash flow (AB cash flow) and the abnormal production cost (AB product cost) among the variables of real activities manipulation are statistically significant, with the expected sign, indicating that firms involved in real earnings management such as the manipulation of sales or production costs tend to engage in accounting fraud.
The ratio of business corporation ownership (CORP) of the Japanese-specific factors has significant differences, although ownership by financial institution (FIN) has no significant results. Cross-shareholdings among business companies may reduce the mutual monitoring function of shareholders and increase the opportunity for accounting fraud.
Finally, Table 6 presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests as a non-parametric measure. The results are similar to those of the t-test reported in Table 5 , except for a few variables of performance. Some variables show significant differences between fraud and non-fraud firms. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . Shaded variables are those with p-values less than 10% and with the correct sign. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . Shaded variables are those with p-values less than 10% and with the correct sign.
(2) Analysis of Misstate 2 Table 7 shows the results for Misstate2. The results are generally consistent with the results for Misstate 1 seen in Table 5 , except that the variable of operating lease (Existence of operating leases) is significant with the expected sign, whereas leverage (Leverage) is not. The results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test for Misstate2 are summarized in Table 8 . The results are also similar to those of Table 6 , except that the variables of off-balance-sheet are more significant. Table 9 shows the AR (accuracy ratio) of all variables for Misstate1 and Misstate2. The AR is a popular indicator, especially for corporate failure prediction models. In this performance indicator, AR reaches 1 when the model's prediction performance becomes perfect.
14 The results show that 1) the variables with higher AR values are common to both Misstate1 and Missate2, and 2) the AR values for Misstate1 are higher than are those for Misstate2. This suggests that the discrimination performance of accounting fraud deteriorated for Misstate2; we infer that this occurred because Misstate2 contains more indefinite samples with less significant incidents (i.e., a small amount of fraud).
Parameter estimation of fraud detection model
(1) Method of estimation
In this section, we develop a prediction model to identify accounting fraud on the basis of the results of the univariate analysis in the previous section. We present the model based on Misstate1 as the main result since, in univariate analysis, the explanatory powers (the AR value) of the variables of Misstate 1 are generally higher than are those of Misstate 2. The results based on Misstate 2 to Misstate 8 are presented as additional analyses.
We performed variable selections and parameter estimations for each model following the procedures of Dechow et al. (2011) . Specifically, (1) candidate variables for use in the prediction model are selected among those in Table 5 or Table 6 with a significance level of 10% or higher with the correct expected sign; (2) a dependent variable is equal to 1 for firm-years involving Misstate1 and 0 otherwise; and (3) a logistic regression is employed to determine a battery of variables and their parameters. Our logistic regression is based on a backward method with a restriction of the correct parameter sign by eliminating a variable step-by-step from the highest p-value. Our research follows the procedures of Dechow et al. (2001) but extend it in the following ways. First, we employ variables relating to discretionary accruals as significant variables, which Dechow et al. (2011) do not use. Although the level and absolute value of discretionary accruals have significant differences in the univariate analysis, both variables should be used in the estimation procedure. However, we use only the absolute value of discretionary accruals in the Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . Shaded variables are those with p-values less than 10% and with the correct sign. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . Shaded variables are those with p-values less than 10% and with the correct sign. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 .
analysis because the two variables have a strong correlation and might cause multicollinearity. Furthermore, as mentioned, the use of absolute values of discretionary accruals has an advantage in that it can capture the effect of accruals reversal. Second, we also employ the variables of conservatism, real activities manipulation, and Japanese-specific factors. All these variables are publicly available and easily obtained by financial statement users. These variables are added to all three models in the settings used by Dechow et al. (2011) . In our univariate analysis, none of the variables of nonfinancial and off-balance-sheet are significant. Therefore, we are not able to build Model 2. Thus, we build the following two models:
16
Model 1: variables available from financial statement in the categories of accruals, performance, market-related incentive, conservatism, real activities manipulation, Japanese-specific factors Model 2: variables in the categories of accruals, performance, conservatism, real activities manipulation, Japanese-specific factors, and market-related incentive (2) Estimation results In estimating the parameters of Models 1 and 2, we incorporate the variables of the three types of discretionary accruals separately into the model because these variables have high correlations. For the same reason, the two variables in the category of conservatism are also incorporated separately into the models. Consequently, we estimate a total of six models as a combination of these variables.
17 From among the results of the six models, we present only the results of the model with the highest AR value.
The regression results are shown in Table 10 . Six variables are selected in Model 1 by the backward elimination method with sign restriction: % Soft assets, CFO discretionary accruals AB, 16 Therefore, the models in our research are equivalent to Models 1 and 3 in Dechow et al. (2011) , with additional variables in the categories of conservatism, real activities manipulation, and Japanese-specific factors. 17 The variables of Ex ante financing need, CFF and Abnormal change in order backlog are excluded, as in Dechow et al. (2011) , because they are available for only a limited set of firms. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 .
Actual issuance, C score AR, AB cash flow, and CORP. The four variables among those are newly added to our model: absolute value of discretional accruals, conservatism score, abnormal operating cash flow to capture abnormal discretional activities, and ownership by business corporation. The results suggest the importance of considering earnings quality and Japanese-specific factors when capturing financial fraud. As for Model 2, the table indicates that six variables are selected: %Soft assets, CFO discretionary accruals AB, Actual issuance, AB cash flow, CORP, and Book-to-market. These variables are almost the same as the results of Model 1, except Book-to-market is a substitute for conservatism (C score AR). The results of the χ 2 value indicate that the value of Book-to-market is highly significant. The result suggests that managers of potential fraud firms are likely to have a strong incentive to maintain higher stock prices, consistent with our prediction.
(3) Further validation
This section reports the estimation results for Misstate2 to Misstate8. As described in section 3.1, we define the variables from Misstate3 to Misstate8 so that we can capture the degree of accounting fraud gradually (see Table 1 ). Table 11 summarizes the estimation results of Model 1. The major findings are as follows. 1) The variables selected for Misstate2 to Misstate8 are almost the same as those for Misstate1; 2) the discriminant power measured by AR is less capable than for Misstate1; and 3) the discriminant power increases as it approaches Misstate8. These results suggest that the discriminant power increases as accounting fraud becomes more severe. Thus, in the following analysis on the validity of our models, we will present the results of the models on the basis of Misstate1.
Performance of the prediction model (1) Calculation of the F-Score
We discuss the validity of our prediction models, Model 1 and Model 2. The F-Score is the predicted probability of financial statement fraud in accordance with Dechow et al. (2011) as follows:
The predicted value is the intensity parameter for the likelihood of financial statement fraud. We then derive the probability by the unconditional expectation (unconditional probability) of Misstate1 to calculate our F-Score. The unconditional probability is a value of the number of accounting fraud samples divided by the total number of samples. An F-Score of 1.00 indicates that the firm has the same probability of accounting fraud as the unconditional expectation. An F-Score greater than 1 indicates firms with higher probabilities of fraud. Below is an example of how this is done for Model 1 for the company named OLYMPUS (stock code #7733) in the financial statements of March 2008: Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . OLYMPUS has an F-Score of 1.88. This suggests that OLYMPUS has almost twice the probability of engaging in financial fraud compared to a randomly selected firm from the population.
(2) Accuracy of the prediction model
In order to test the validity of our F-Score in Models 1 and 2, we calculate the detection rate for accounting fraud firms as follows. We 1) sort all samples into five portfolios on the basis of the F-Score in ascending order, and 2) observe the frequency of the accounting fraud firms and non-accounting fraud firms in each quintile. If our models do a good job of identifying the accounting fraud firms, we expect the accounting fraud firms to be clustered in the fifth portfolio.
The results are reported in Table 12 . For Model 1, 59.39% of the accounting fraud firms are in quintile 5, which is higher than the expected level of 20%. For Model 2, 90.83% of the accounting fraud firms are in quintile 5. Since the percentages in Dechow et al. (2011) are around 50% for all models, our model demonstrated superior performance. The cutoff to be included in quintile 5 (i.e., the minimum value) is 1.205 for Model 1 and 1.293 for Model 2, both above the 1.00 of the unconditional expectation.
(3) Type I and Type II error rates of the prediction model
In this section, we discuss the Type I error and Type II error of our models. A Type I error means that the model incorrectly classifies a non-accounting fraud firm (non-FSF firm) as an accounting fraud firm (FSF firm), and a Type II effort means the model incorrectly classifies a FSF firm as a non-FSF firm. We classify the observations based on the following procedure. We 1) define a firm with an F-Score of 1.00 or more as a predicted FSF firm (pred-FSF) and that with an F-Score less than 1.00 as a predicted non-FSF firm (pred-NonFSF); 2) we count the number of FSF and non-FSF firms among pred-FSF firms, and then 3) count the number of FSF and non-FSF firms among pred-NonFSF firms. Table 13 shows the result of the classifications. The "correct classification" is the sum of the number of FSF firms among pred-FSF firms and the number of Non-FSF firms among pred-NonFSF firms, divided by the total firms. The result for Model 1 indicates that the correct classification rate is 75.07%, and the sensitivity is 66.38%.
Since the Type I error is defined as the misclassifications of Non-FSF firms as FSF firms, the Figure 1 also provides helpful insights into the cost of these errors. The costs of Type I and Type II errors are not the same; the costs depend on who uses this information. For example, from an auditor's perspective, the cost of Type II errors seems to be far higher than that of Type I errors, since the former is the cost of overlooking an FSF firm. When an FSF firm goes undetected and is later revealed, the auditor is likely to be sanctioned by regulatory bodies and suffer a loss of reputation. Meanwhile, the cost of a Type I error is also not zero. It may result in lost fees, as the auditor may choose to drop a client. Because Type II errors are more costly to the auditor, an auditor is likely to prefer an F-Score cutoff that makes more Type I errors than Type II errors (Dechow et al. 2011, p. 62) . Figure 2 provides a tradeoff cost between Type I and Type II errors. The figure provides a ratio of the sum of the number of Type I errors (misclassification of FSF firms) and Sensitivity (correct classification of FSF and NonFSF firms) divided by the number of Sensitivity. We assume that the cost of investigating a firm is 1 yen (Y ) and that an investigation always detects FSF firms if they exist. At an F-Score cutoff of 1.00, the relative cost ratio is Y79.13 [(11,876+152) /152] for model 1. In other words, a cost of Y12,028 is incurred to avoid the 152 FSF firms. Therefore, if a cost of missing a FSF firm is Y79.13 or more, then an F-Score cutoff of 1.00 should be used by the auditor. If the cost is over Y230, then all firms should be investigated, because the F-Score cutoff is equal to zero. If the cost is less than Y5, it is cheaper not to do the investigation and to just pay the extra cost of the FSF firms as they are identified. Because the relative cost ratio is about Y20, even the F-Score cutoff is around Y5.
(4) Marginal analysis of the prediction model In this section, we evaluate the influence of each of the variables in the models for determining the magnitude of the F-Score (marginal effect analysis). We 1) calculate the value of the F-Score when all variables are held at their mean values, 2) recalculate the F-Score after moving one independent variable to its lower quartile value, holding all other variables at their mean values, 18 3) recalculate the F-Score, moving the independent variable to its upper quartile value, 4) calculate the change in the F-Score across the interquartile range for that variable, and 5) repeat steps 2) through 4) for the next independent variable. Table 14 summarizes the results. Panel A summarizes the descriptive statistics of each variable. Panel B shows the marginal effect of Model 1, revealing that the top three largest effect variables are %Soft assets, CFO discretionary accruals AB, and Actual issuance. It is noteworthy that the two variables relating to accruals have large marginal effects. Panel C shows the marginal effect of Model 2. We find that the top three largest effect variables are %Soft assets, Actual issuance, and Book-to-market. Among these, Book-to-market has an exceedingly high marginal effect. Finally, Panel D shows a matrix of the correlations among the variables. The correlations are all significant and are generally consistent with the results of the marginal effect analysis along with the above analysis. For example, the correlation coefficients in the Spearman's correlation in Model 1 increase in the order of %Soft assets, Actual issuance, and CFO discretionary accruals AB, and these three variables are the same as the three found in the marginal effect analysis.
(5) Robustness tests Finally, we conduct robustness tests to investigate the sensitivity of our models to the industry and the time period examined. In our analysis of the detection rate in Table 12 , we use the same sample both to develop our prediction model and to evaluate its effectiveness. This may cause overestimates of the predictive ability due to the hindsight bias. To address the issue, we use data covering 2000 to 2006 to build the prediction models and data covering 2007 to 2010 to evaluate their predictive ability. The analyses conducted in the previous section are replicated based on the above out sample seen in Table 15 . Panels A through C show the results of the parameter estimation (the same as is shown in Table 10 ), prediction ability (the same as is shown in Table 12 ), and Type I and Type II errors (the same as is shown in Table 13 Table 10 and Table 15 . We find that two variables, the change of cash flow margin (Change in cash margin) and the change of free cash flow (Change in free cash flows), are selected in Model 1, instead of abnormal operating cash flow (AB cash flow) and conservative score (C score AR). The panel also shows that, in Model 2, the abnormal operating cash flow is deselected. Note: All variables are defined in Table 2 . Table 13 . Thus, the results obtained using the subperiod samples show no significant differences from our main results. Finally, to test the impact of industry differences on our results, we build models with industry indicator variables for Electronics, Construction, Trading, and Services, industries with relatively large numbers of firms. Although some industry indicator variables are selected as significant variables for both Model 1 and Model 2, the other selected variables are almost the same as those in the main results, and the models' predictive ability shows no significant differences from the main results (in untabulated results).
Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the relationship between accounting fraud and accounting information for Japanese firms. Our accounting fraud sample consists of two subsamples: 1) firms that have been accused or had administrative monetary penalties imposed by the SESC and 2) firms that have announced accounting fraud at timely disclosure disclosures. Specifically, we 1) explore the characteristics of accounting fraud firms by analyzing financial information obtained from the annual reports of Japanese firms and 2) develop a model to predict accounting fraud based on the characteristics of Japanese fraud firms.
To identify the characteristics of fraud firms, we focus on 38 variables for the eight factors of accruals quality, performance, nonfinancial measures, off-balance-sheet activities, market-related incentives, conservatism, real-activities manipulation, and Japanese-specific factors.
Through our univariate analysis and model building process, we find that accrual quality, market-related incentive, real activities manipulation, conservatism, and Japanese-specific factors are generally useful for detecting accounting fraud. Our analysis contributes to prior studies by clarifying the importance of focusing on the various dimensions of earnings quality and country-specific factors.
For example, the marginal effect analysis reveals that soft asset ratio, actual issuance, and the absolute value of discretional accruals are useful when we focus on the accounting information in annual reports (i.e., the variables in Model 1). Further, when we add stock-related variables to the model, we find that the book-to-market has a higher marginal effect. In general, our prediction models for identifying accounting fraud have stronger predictive ability than do those developed by previous studies. Our models can be used widely in various aspects of accounting and finance practice.
Our results have several important implications for business practice. For example, auditors and regulatory bodies could use the model to reduce their investigation costs and improve the accuracy of their judgments. Furthermore, capital providers such as stock investors and banks could also improve their decision-making by estimating the probability of accounting fraud using our prediction model. Although investment strategies on the basis of accrual quality such as accrual anomalies have already become popular, stock investors in the Japanese market might be able to consider their investment strategies based on the F-Score. Furthermore, creditors could also use the F-Score to evaluate the credit risk in lending or doubtful accounts receivable.
Finally, this study has several limitations. Our main accounting fraud samples are based on firms that have been accused or had administrative monetary penalties imposed by the (SESC). We cannot deny the possibility that the SESC has misclassified an accounting fraud firm as a non-fraud firm because its investigatory power is limited. To address this issue, we supplemented the observations by using timely disclosure information and conducted additional analyses based on the extended sample. However, we cannot entirely rule out the sample selection issue.
Furthermore, we do not examine the effect of corporate governance on accounting fraud except for two Japanese-specific factors.
19 As Dechow et al. (2011) also argue, this is because the availability of data on corporate governance are limited and costly, reducing the practicability of our prediction models. It is important to examine the relationship between accounting fraud and corporate governance in future research. Finally, it might be useful to focus on the information concerning internal control such as significant deficiency and material weakness for predicting accounting fraud.
In general, the CAP curves of the prediction models are positioned between two curves (i.e., the perfect model and the random model). It shows higher accuracy when the CAP curve in the estimated model swells out widely. The AR is the ratio of the area between the estimated model and the random model (Region B) divided by the sum of the area between the perfect model and the estimated model (Region A) and Region B as follows:
In the perfect model, AR becomes 1 because Region A is 0. In the random model, AR becomes 0 because Region B is 0. Therefore, the larger AR closer to 1 (i.e., closer to the perfect model) indicates a better prediction result.
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